Franklyn Foster v. Attorney General United States by unknown
2013 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
8-27-2013 
Franklyn Foster v. Attorney General United States 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013 
Recommended Citation 
"Franklyn Foster v. Attorney General United States" (2013). 2013 Decisions. 325. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2013/325 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2013 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
CLD-379        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-1982 
 ___________ 
 
 FRANKLYN FOSTER 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;  
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY; FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR FOR  
PHILADELPHIA IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS  
ENFORCEMENT FIELD OFFICE; MARY SABOL, 
        Appellants 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civ. No. 1-12-cv-02579) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Christopher C. Conner
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted on Appellants’ Motion for Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
August 8, 2013 
 Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 27, 2013) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Appellants appeal from the District Court’s order granting Franklyn Foster’s 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus and directing the Attorney General to provide him 
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with a bond hearing.  We will vacate and remand for further proceedings. 
 Foster is a citizen of Trinidad and Tobago and a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States.  He has numerous criminal convictions in Maryland and most recently 
pleaded guilty to a fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault in 2011.  He 
was released from state custody in April 2011.  In November 2011, the Government 
served him with a notice to appear charging him as removable for having been convicted 
of aggravated felonies and crimes involving moral turpitude.  The same day, the 
Government took him into mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which 
requires detention without bond for certain criminal aliens.  See Sylvain v. Att’y Gen., 
714 F.3d 154-55 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 After having been in immigration custody for approximately 14 months, Foster 
filed pro se a habeas petition arguing that he was entitled to a bond hearing because (1) 
the Government lost the authority to detain him under § 1226(c) when it did not do so 
immediately following his release from state custody, and (2) even if his initial detention 
under § 1226(c) were lawful, his continued detention has become unreasonably long as a 
matter of due process.  The District Court agreed with the first of these arguments and, by 
order entered February 4, 2013, it granted Foster’s petition and ordered the Attorney 
General to provide him with a bond hearing on that basis.  The District Court did not 
reach Foster’s second argument regarding the duration of his confinement.  An 
Immigration Judge has since conducted a bond hearing and ordered Foster’s release on 
$10,000 bond (although, as explained in the margin, it is not clear from the record 
3 
 
whether Foster has posted bond and been released).
1
  Foster’s immigration proceeding 
remains ongoing.  Appellants have appealed from the District Court’s February 4 order 
and have filed a motion to summarily reverse it in light of our subsequent decision in 
Sylvain.
2
 
 That motion is granted in part.  We agree with the Government that Sylvain, of 
which the District Court did not have the benefit when it rendered its decision, has 
invalidated the basis for the District Court’s ruling.  In that case, we held that the 
Government retains the authority to take aliens into mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
even if it does not do so immediately upon their release from state custody.  See Sylvain, 
714 F.3d at 161.  Because the District Court’s contrary conclusion was the sole basis for 
its grant of habeas relief, its ruling (which Foster does not defend on appeal) cannot 
stand. 
 We disagree with the Government’s further argument, however, that we should 
simply reverse because “there are no other issues to resolve.”  Ordinarily, a reversal on 
the basis of Sylvain would have the effect of setting aside the bond proceeding.  See id. at 
161 n.12.  In this case, however, Foster asserted another ground for relief that also would 
entitle him to a bond hearing—i.e., that his detention under § 1226(c) has been 
unreasonably long.  See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 678 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2012); Diop, 
                                                 
1
 Foster filed a motion in the District Court seeking a reduction in the $10,000 bond, which the 
District Court denied.  He asserts on appeal that he remained in custody at least as of June 11, 
2013, but the Government has not addressed his custody status. 
 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and we have jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  See Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2011).  We may 
take summary action when an appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; 3d 
Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
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656 F.3d at 232-33.  The District Court did not reach this argument, and Foster continues 
to press it on appeal.  Whether Foster’s detention is (or was) unreasonably long “is a fact-
dependent inquiry requiring an assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case.”  
Diop, 656 F.3d at 234.  We will remand for the District Court to conduct that inquiry in 
the first instance.
3
   
 If the District Court determines that Foster’s detention has not been unreasonably 
long, then it should deny his petition and thus effectively set aside his bond proceeding 
consistent with Sylvain.  If the District Court determines that Foster’s detention has been 
unreasonably long, by contrast, then he is entitled to “an individualized inquiry into 
whether detention is still necessary to fulfill the [mandatory detention] statute’s purposes 
of ensuring that an alien attends removal proceedings and that his release will not pose a 
danger to the community.”  Diop, 656 F.3d at 231.  We express no opinion on whether 
the bond hearing that Foster already has received qualifies or otherwise has effectively 
afforded him relief. 
 One final point requires brief discussion.  In addition to the claims discussed 
above, Foster asserted in his habeas petition that his mandatory detention under § 1226(c) 
is unlawful because certain of his convictions occurred before § 1226(c) was enacted in 
1996.  He expressly disclaimed seeking any relief in that regard, however, and the 
                                                 
3
 We express no opinion on the merits of Foster’s claim except to note the following.  Foster’s 
release from custody would not necessarily render his habeas petition moot.  See Diop, 656 F.3d 
at 226-29.  If Foster remains in custody, his detention since November 10, 2011, far exceeds the 
period of up to five months during which aliens typically are detained under § 1226(c).  See id. at 
233-34.  The Government argues that Foster’s prolonged custody is due to the number of 
continuances that the Immigration Judge has granted at his request.  While that is a highly 
relevant consideration, it is not necessarily dispositive.  See Leslie, 678 F.3d at 269; Diop, 656 
F.3d at 234. 
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Government asserts that he remains subject to mandatory detention because he was 
convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude in 2011—i.e., a sexual offense in the 
fourth degree under Md. Code Ann., Crim. Law, § 3-308.  Foster has not challenged that 
assertion or otherwise mentioned this issue on appeal, but we will leave it to the District 
Court to address it in the first instance if necessary on remand. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order granting 
Foster’s habeas petition and remand for further proceedings.  
